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Non-Majority Union Representation
Conforms to ILO Freedom of Association
Principles And (Potentially) Promotes
Inter-Union Collaboration: New Zealand
Lessons For Canada

North American union certification violates workers' freedom of association, a
fundamental human right well established by the International Labour Organization
(ILO); by denying workers the right to be represented when a majority of their
co-workers does not favour a union. In Canada, the Supreme Court has drawn
on ILO standards to recognize a constitutional right to bargain collectively and
organize as part of freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. However, such recognition of the ILO principles has, as
yet, to translate into legislation that would provide non-exclusive, non-majority
union representation, at least in workplaces where majority support has not been
demonstrated. This disinclination to change the existing system reflects the
widespread belief that non-exclusive representation would spawn multi-union
representation and a corresponding deterioration in inter-union relationships. We
challenge this assumption, using results from a survey of inter-union collaboration
in New Zealand, where there is a non-exclusive, non-majority (minority) union
representation system. We find that collaboration is commonplace, especially
with respect to bargaining and policy issues.
Le processus nord-ambricain d'accr~ditation des syndicats viole la libert6
d'association des travailleurs, droit fondamental de la personne solidement ancr6
dans l'Organisation internationale du travail (OT), en refusant aux travailleurs le
droit d'4tre reprdsentds lorsqu'une majorit6 de leurs collgues ne veulent pas
de Ia syndicalisation. Au Canada, la Cour supr~me sest inspirde des normes
de I'OIT pour reconnattre un droit constitutionnel de sorganiser et de ndgocier
collectivement dans le cadre de libert6 d'association pr6vue au paragraphe 2(d)
de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertds. Toutefois, cette reconnaissance
des principes de l'OIT ne s'est toujours pas traduite en mesures Idgislatives qui
permettraient la representation non exclusive et non majoritaire par syndicat, au
moins dans les milieux de travail ot) le soutien de la majorit6 n'est pas ddmontr6.
Cette r6ticence J modifier le syst~me existant refl~te la croyance fort r6pandue
que la representation non exclusive donnerait lieu & la repr6sentation par de
multiples syndicats et la ddtdrioration concomitante des relations entre ces
derniers. Nous contestons cette prdsomption et pour ce faire, nous utilisons les
rdsultats dun sondage sur la collaboration entre syndicats men6 en NouvelleZ6lande ot) existe un systame de reprdsentation syndicale non exclusive et non
majoritaire (minoritaire). Nous constatons que la collaboration est la rbgle, en
particulier pour ce qui est de la n6gociation et des enjeux politiques.
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Introduction
The North American union representation system, the so-called Wagner
System,' was founded on the principles of majoritarianism, exclusivity,
and compulsion. Majoritarianism means that, to be certified, the bargaining
agent must be supported by a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit. If the majority do not support the union, the bargaining unit will not be
given union representation. Exclusivity means that only the union which
won majority support may represent the employees in the bargaining unit.
Compulsion requires all workers in the unit to accept the sole certified
union representation, irrespective of their individual representation or
membership preference, at least until the next open period when other
unions have the opportunity to compete for sole representation. As a result,
workers not in the majority, who did not vote for the certified agent, have
no freedom to associate with a different union of their choice; nor do they
have the freedom not to associate with any union by remaining employed
on an individual employment contract.
Why is there a renewed interest in examining this long established
system? First, the injustice in denying minority rights is not something
that will go away with time. With a workforce more diverse than ever,

1.

National Labor Relations Act, Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 452 (codified as amended at 29 USC
(1935)).

§ 151-169
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and minority worker groups of various kinds becoming more prominent,
it is not only ethically wrong to ignore the pleas of minority workers for
proper representation, but also politically unwise to do so. Second, the
US representation system has been challenged by reputable legal scholars
and labour activists arguing for a reinterpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act to allow for multiple minority representation where there
is no majority representation in place.2 Third, and most relevant for the
purposes of this paper, recent landmark Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
cases (e.g., Health Services andSupport -Facilities SubsectorBargaining
Association v. British Columbia' and Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney
General)') have emphasized International Labour Organization (ILO)
freedom of association principles in establishing constitutional rights
to organize and bargain collectively.' The latest development involving
the SCC's Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser6 decision clarified that
legislatures are indeed not required to enact laws prescribing exclusive
representation. Neither is legislation not requiring exclusive representation
necessarily unconstitutional. This can have widespread implications. More
on these cases is discussed in later sections.
The internationallabourorganizationand minority representation
rights
The ILO is the tripartite United Nation "agency that brings together
representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape
policies and programmes promoting Decent Work for all."' Freedom
of association is a fundamental human right covered in both the UN
declarations and ILO conventions.' Specifically, Article 20 of the 1948
United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights states that "(1) (e)veryone
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; (2) no one
may be compelled to belong to an association."9 ILO Convention 87 of July
I.

2.
See e.g., Charles J Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the
American Workplace Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005; Clyde Summers, "Unions without
Majority -A Black Hole?" (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent L Rev 531.
3.
Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391.
4.
Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore].
5. Judy Fudge, "The Supreme Court of Canada and The Right to Bargain Collectively: The
Implications of the Health Services and Support Case in Canada and Beyond" (2008) 37 Indus LJ 25.
6.
Ontario (AG) vFraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3.
7.
International Labour Organization online: <www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.
htm>.
8. Roy Adams, Labour left out: Canada Failure to Protect and Promote Collective Bargaining as
a Human Right. (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006).
9.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(#), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN
Doc A/810, (1948).
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1948 (Article 2), which Canada has ratified, further adds that: "workers
and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to
establish, and subject only to the rules of the organization concerned,
to join organizations of their own choosing." 0 Similar provisions are
contained in the various multilateral treaties adopted by the UN, including
Article 8 (1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights of December 1966, which protects "the right of everyone
to form trade unions and join the union of his choice, subject only to the
rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of
his economic and social interests"," and Article 22 (1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 1966 which reiterates
"[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests." 2
According to ILO documents, the most common problems with freedom
of association, noted by the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Convention and Recommendations (an ILO supervisory body), "relate in
particular to the denial of the right to collective bargaining, ...as well as the
requirement for trade union organizations to represent too high a proportion
of workers to be recognized or to engage in collective bargaining."" The
Committee still approves of national legal regimes providing for exclusive
representation, as long as the sole union agent is legally obliged to fairly
and equally represent all workers in the bargaining unit.14 This feature of
the Wagner system is unproblematic from an ILO perspective. However,
"(p)roblems may arise when the law stipulates that a trade union must
receive the support of 50 per cent of the members of a bargaining unit to
be recognized as a bargaining agent,"" because unions failing to secure
majority support from the bargaining unit are denied any representation
rights. The Committee maintains that "if no union covers more than 50
per cent of the workers, collective bargaining rights should be granted

10. Convention (ILO No 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Prtection of the Right to
Organize, 9 July 1948, 68 UNTS 17, CTS 1973/14.
11. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993
UNTS 3, Can TS 1976/46.
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, arts
9-14, Can TS 1976 No 47 [ICCPR].
13. Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero & Horacio Guido, "ILO principles concerning collective
bargaining" (2000) 139 International Labour Review 33 at 53.
14. ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining. (Geneva: International Labour
Conference 81 " Session, 1994) online: International Labour Organization <http://www.ilo.org/ public/
libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(1994-81-4B).pdf> at paras 97, 99.
15. Ibidatpara241.
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to all the unions in this unit, at least on behalf of their own members."16
Obviously, this is a major freedom of association issue in North America,
because the Wagner system doesn't guarantee union representation rights
in the absence of majority support.
II. The ILO, the Supreme Court of Canada, & minority representation
rights
The Supreme Court of Canada has fashioned constitutional rights to
organize and bargain collectively, as part of freedom of association under
section 2(d) of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms," relying
heavily on ILO documents, conventions, and arguments. In the British
Columbia Health Services case, the BC government took the unprecedented
unilateral action, in the face of a severe fiscal crisis, to promptly pass
Bill 29 (2001),18 suspending health workers' right to bargain collectively
and thereby setting the stage for wage and condition reductions.19 The
healthcare unions responded by launching a constitutional challenge on
the grounds that Bill 29 violated the CharterofRights and Freedom. In its
decision concerning the case, the SCC clarified two important issues by
applying ILO principles. First, it acknowledged that the activities of labour
unions, in organizing and bargaining collectively, fall within the scope of
freedom of association, because the ILO hasjudged them to be fundamental
human rights.2 0 Second, the SCC determined that "the Charter should be
presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the
international human rights documents that Canada has ratified." 2' In the
end, the SCC declared the Bill 29 legislation unconstitutional and stated that
the government, both as employer and law-maker, should not substantially
interfere with the workers' association activities or "seriously undercut or
undermine the activity of workers joining together to pursue the common
goals of negotiating workplace conditions and terms of employment..."2
After this decision, the British Columbia Supreme Court decided in April
2011 that the legislation passed by Bill 28 (2002),23 similarly restricting

16. lbidatpara241.
17. CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
18. Bill 29, Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, 2nd Sess, 37th Leg, British
Columbia, 2001 (assented to 28 January 2002), SBC 2002, c 2.
19.. Fudge, supra note 4 at 27.
20. Ibid, see also Judy Fudge, "The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental
Rights?" (2007) 29 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 29.
21. BC Health Services, supra note 2 at para 79.
22. BC Health Services, supra note 2, at paras 90-92.
23. Bill 28, Public Education Flexibility and Choice Act, 2nd Sess, 37th Leg, British Columbia,
2002 (assented to 28 January 2002), SBC 2002, c 3.
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collective bargaining for the British Columbia Teachers' Federation, was
also unconstitutional.24
In the Dunmore case, the appellants argued that excluding agricultural
workers from the Ontario Labour Relations Act was a violation of
freedom of association under the Charterof Rights and Freedom, because
it severely compromised the union's ability to organize. In contravention,
the Attorney General claimed that labour organizations and collective
bargaining were a threat to the economic viability of fragile familyowned farms. The Court, however, did not find this stance substantiated
and decided that the wholesale exclusion of agricultural workers was an
unjustified infringement of their freedom of association. Moreover, the
Court held that the state is obliged, under the Charter,to "extend protective
legislation to unprotected groups"25 to be truly consistent with the meaning
of freedom of association.
The Dunmore case clearly shows that the right to organize, as part
of the freedom to associate, is a fundamental human right, one which
should not normally be abrogated, especially to protect the interests of the
majority. The BC Health Services case shows that collective bargaining,
as an institution, is integral to freedom of association; any attempt to
undermine it in a substantial way is therefore also contravening workers'
human rights. In both these cases, the SCC invoked ILO principles and
referred to specific ILO conventions. As precedents, these cases are likely
to steer Canadian courts towards a heavier reliance on ILO principles
in deciphering a freedom of association which better protects workers,
especially if they constitute a weak and vulnerable minority.
Why are these latest changes, invoking ILO principles in interpreting
the Charter,worth particular attention? For decades, the SCC determined
that Canada's union representation system lay beyond the scope of
protection afforded by the Charter's freedom of association, now, things
are apparently changing and this assumption needs to be revisited.
As noted in the Dunmore case, "(t)he notion that under-inclusion can
infringe freedom of association is not only implied by Canadian Charter
jurisprudence, but is also consistent with international human rights
law."26 Since the exclusive representation system inevitably denies the
freedom of association to minority groups in the workplace, it follows
that such 'under-inclusion' is certainly an infringement of fundamental

24. British Columbia Teachers'Federation v British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 469, 20 BCLR (5th)
123.
25. Dunmore, supra note 5 at para 20.
26. Dunmore, supra note 5 at para 27.
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human rights as recognized in ILO principles. The next seemingly logical
step for the SCC, in extending the application of ILO principles, could
involve ensuring that provincial and federal governments enact suitable
labour legislation to protect the associational activity rights of minority
worker groups, especially in workplaces currently lacking an exclusive
bargaining agent.2 7
III. Non-exclusive, on-majority representation:New Zealand as a test
case for inter-union relationships
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions, which recognize
the importance of freedom of association, have not, as yet, produced
corresponding legislative change. One obvious reason for this is that
there is a lingering, deep-seated fear, shared with unionists and others,
that non-exclusive representation would cause a lot more inter-union
conflict, with unions actively vying to represent the same bargaining units,
which in turn, could accentuate the power imbalance between unions and
employers, as well as fragment the overall labour movement. This fear
was perhaps most colourfully expressed by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Fraserv Ontario,28 when it ruled against the Agricultural Employees
Protection Act 2002,29 passed in response to Dunmore. In defending the
Wagner System, the Court declared: "(i)t is not overstating the point to
say that to avoid chaos in the workplace to the detriment of the employer
and employees alike, it is essential that a representative organization be
selected on a majoritarian basis and imbued with exclusive bargaining
rights."" At issue in this appeal case was whether it was unconstitutional
to exclude farm workers from Ontario's Labour Relations Act 1 and place
them under a new separate Agricultural Employees Protection Act,32
which has different provisions in regards to bargaining, dispute resolution,
and union representation which do not necessarily preclude multiple
representation. Following the Court of Appeal's decision that the AEPA
was unconstitutional, the case went to the SCC, which overturned the Court
of Appeal's ruling." In its decision, the SCC found that "(f)arm workers
in Ontario are entitled to meaningful processes by which they can pursue

27. Roy JAdams, "Non-statutory Unionism and the Right to Bargain Collectively" (Paper presented
at the Conference on Freedom of Association: Harmonizing Canadian Norms and International
Obligations, Saskatoon, Canada, 25-27 February 2010).
28. Fraserv Ontario(Attorney General), 2008 ONCA760, 92 OR (3d) 481.
29. Agricultural Employees ProtectionAct, SO 2002, c 16.
30. Ibid at para 92.
31. Labour RelationsAct, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule 1.
32. Supra, note 29.
33. Ontario (Attorney General), supranote 5.
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workplace goals" even if the "AEPA does not provide all the protections
the LRA extends to many other workers."34 Moreover, "(1)egislatures are
not constitutionally required ... to enact laws that set up a uniform model
of labour relations imposing a statutory duty to bargain in good faith,
statutory recognition of the principles of exclusive majority representation
... What is protected is associational activity, not a particular process or
result."" It is too early to tell if this latest turn of events can be interpreted
as opening the doors for possible minority unionism, but, at the very least,
it shows minority unionism can be made legal. The more important issue
now is whether legislatures have the will to introduce it given the ingrained
belief that non-exclusive union representation is necessarily associated
with problematic conflicts and chaos.
The assumption that non-exclusive representation inevitably produces
conflict has not been systematically tested in Canada or the US, using
evidence from large samples, for the simple reason that the exclusive
representation system does not allow multi-union representation in the
same bargaining units. What is known about inter-union conflict comes
mainly from studies of raiding3 6 but these are winner-take-all contests in
which one union wins and the other loses (or both lose). It follows that
these studies can tell us little about what would happen in a multi-union,
minority representation regime, where sharing representation in the same
workplace is both an option and even normal.
Perhaps more cogently, inter-union relationships in a multiple
union setting do not have to be competitive. There is another side to
such relationships-collaboration-which has attracted little academic
attention. The traditional focus on inter-union conflict has distracted
theorists, policy-makers, and practitioners from the potentially
collaborative nature of relationships in a multi-union setting. Is it therefore
appropriate to continue to dismiss legislative reforms, promoting and
legitimizing minority unionism? In this paper, we investigate the nature
and extent of collaboration among unions in a multi-union setting; the
focus of their collaboration: (organizing, bargaining, lobbying, etc.); the
benefits unions receive from collaborating and suggest reforms which
would help to promote more collaboration.
The empirical data for this study come from a survey of union leaders
in New Zealand, which has a system of non-majority, non-exclusive,
34. Ibid at paras 116-117.
35. Ibidatpara8.
36. See e.g. Clyde Scott, Edwin Arnold & Charles Odewahn, "Raid Elections: Another Problems
for Unions?" (1992) 21 Public Personnel Management 555; Gary N Chaison, "The Frequency and
Outcomes of Union Raids" (1976) 15 Industrial Relations 107.
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members-only union representation, where multiple unions may represent
workers in the same bargaining unit. New Zealand is a good alternative
setting to Canada for studying inter-union relationships, because both
countries share many characteristics. They are both English-speaking
western countries with a similar liberal market economy, similar business
union orientation, the presence of a supporting union federation, ethnic
diversity, and a comparable national culture with respect to Hofstede's
dimensions." This timely study is intended to provide useful information
for any potential consideration of a more open Canadian regime, prompted
by the latest SCC developments, and characterized by non-exclusive
minority union representation.
In the following sections, we first provide a conceptual framework for
inter-union cooperation. This is followed by a description of the survey
method, data analysis, discussion, and conclusion.
IV Conceptualframeworkfor inter-unioncooperation
Inter-union cooperation can occur for different reasons. First and
foremost, "[i]deologically, all unions are tied together by the objective
of securing workers' rights in our society."" Collaborating to build union
solidarity within the working class is therefore fundamental to achieving
this objective. On the utilitarian side, inter-union cooperation can bring
many benefits to unions and their membership. As the saying goes, 'union
is power.' By banding together, unions can have a much stronger voice
and influence on other actors in the industrial relations system, namely,
the employers and the government. Below, we describe a few common
areas of collaboration among unions. These areas include collaboration
over bargaining, organizing, policy, and other issues.
1. Collaborationover bargaining
To gain greater power and leverage over the employer, unions in the same
workplace, especially those representing workers of the same unit may
want, or even need, to strategically collaborate in bargaining. Research has
shown that if worker groups are labour substitutes, they can raise wages
by bargaining together. No doubt partly for this reason, 29% of responding
union representatives in the 1980 UK Workplace Industrial relations Survey

37. Nancy JAdler, "Chapter 2: How Do Cultural Differences Affect Organizations?", in International
Dimensions. of Organizational Behaviour 3d ed (Cincinatti: South-Western College Publishing,
1997) at 39. This book chapter compares countries, using Hofstede's cultural dimensions, namely,
Individualism versus Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Career Success and
Quality of Life.
38. Richard W Hurd & Sharon Pinnock, "Public Sector Unions: Will They Thrive or Struggle to
Survive?" (2004) 25 Journal of Labor Research 211 at 211.
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supported the notion of joining forces to effectively avoid the employers'
'divide and rule' trap.39 There is certainly strength in numbers. If unions
bargain separately and have different collective agreements expiring at
different times, they cannot strike, in combination, to force employer
concessions. Employers can then easily handle a 'partial strike' by relying
on non-striking workers to pull through the tough period. Joint efforts
in bargaining, and in strikes particularly, make sense when the unions'
interests and bargaining agendas are similar, and the issue of overlapping
in membership is not severe. 40 Indeed, when unions join together in their
bargaining, they can act like a monopoly and achieve advantages similar
to those of an exclusive agent. Using an economic model of a two-union
situation, Martins confirms that union coalition and collusion is always
better than union competition in terms of union outcomes. 4 1
As for how unions collaborate, the form and extent of the collaboration
can vary over a broad spectrum. At the lowef levels of cooperation, unions
may simply share background information on bargaining issues, exchange
bargaining agenda items, and provide mutual support and encouragement
by, for instance, respecting each others' striking members and picket
lines, (even though there is no legal protection in Canada or the US for
workers missing work in order to not cross another union's picket line).
At a medium level of cooperation, unions may consult with each other on
bargaining issues and coordinate their negotiation plans by, for example,
synchronizing their bargaining agendas. At higher levels of cooperation,
unions can form formal longer-term strategic alliances by having joint
negotiations and joint collective agreements. Such initiatives are not a new
concept, having existed for over a century in the US, in the construction
industry back in the 1880s and in the railroads around 1902,42 despite the
lack of specific legislation provisions enabling employers to negotiate
multi-union collective agreements.
A number of conditions have been proposed as catalysts for the
growth of coordinated or joint negotiations, some of them are described

39. Stephen Machin, Mark B Stewart & John Van Reenen, "The Economic Effects of Multiple
Unionism: Evidence from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey" (1993) 95 Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 279 at 282.
40. Agnes Akkerman, "Union Competition and Strikes: The Need for Analysis at the Sectoral Level"
(2008) 61 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 445.
41. Ana Paula Martins, "Union Duopoly with Heterogeneous Labour" (2005) 32 International
Journal of Social Economics 339.
42. Abraham Cohen, "Coordinated Bargaining and Structures of Collective Bargaining" (1975) 26
Lab LJ 375; George Hildebrand, "Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of View" Industrial
Relations Research Association Proceedings of the 1968 Annual Spring Meeting, Madison, Wisconsin.
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below. 43 First, increasingly complex labour issues may demand too many
resources and too much expertise for any single union to provide. A
decline in relative bargaining power spurred by union fragmentation or
some other weaknesses can also stimulate cooperation. With declining
union density in many countries, unions can find it increasingly necessary
to work together to build their strength. Similarly, an increase in the
employer's relative bargaining power, reflecting larger corporate size or
more centralized policies across multi-sites, can drive unions to partner
up to re-tilt the power balance. Standardization in terms and conditions
of employment within an organization or industry can also drive unions
to collaborate in bargaining, because, in such situations, unions usually
need more bargaining power to resist such homogenization and customize
benefits to workers and their workplaces.
2. Collaborationover organizing
At first glance, collaboration over organizing seems implausible,
especially when unions represent workers in the same bargaining unit. The
belief that unions always fight each other while recruiting from the same
membership pool is predicated on a few key assumptions-that unions are
economically rational, self-interested organizations with a strong focus on
dues maximisation; that the pursuit of self-interest is unconstrained by
institutional norms; and that the economic benefits of additional members
generally exceeds the costs.44
These assumptions are all subject to challenge. First, many unions
have a social democratic orientation which stresses achieving "...reforms
within both the economy and society..."4 to advance the broader interests
of the entire working class. This is corroborated by a Canadian study of
union democracy, which shows that many unions venture beyond the
narrow concerns and activities of collective bargaining, which serve
their immediate members, to embrace a wider, social democratic focus
on political and social causes, often in combination with other unions.46
Since fighting other unions for members produces no net gains in total
union membership, many unions are likely to view such conflicts as being
43. See Abraham Cohen, "Union Rationale and Objectives of Coordinated Bargaining" (1976) 27
Lab LJ 75.
44. See e.g. Mark Addleson, "Stories about Firms: Boundaries, Structures, Strategies, and Processes"
(2001), 22, 5 Managerial and Decision Economics 169; Morris Altman, "Behavioral Economics,
Power, Rational Inefficiencies, Fuzzy Sets, and Public Policy" (2005) 39 Journal of Economic
Issues 683.
45. John Godard, IndustrialRelations, The Economy, and Society, 2d ed (North York: Captus Press,
2000) at 523.
46. Michael Lynk, "Union Democracy and the Law in Canada" (2000) 21 Journal of Labor Research
37.
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incompatible with a social democratic perspective of the union's purpose.
In the worst case scenario, such conflict can even be mutually destructive.
In a US study of union raiding, it was found that workers failed to elect
either the incumbent or raiding union as their exclusive representative in
11% of such cases, preferring to not be represented instead. 47
Second, unions affiliated to labour federations are not 'free' to raid other
unions or poach their members, because this is prohibited by federation
regulations or by federation-brokered agreements. For example, at the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO), a mandatory 'no raiding' agreement was put in place in 1958
by the federation's constitution.4 8 Member unions failing to abide by this
agreement can face penalties and disciplinary action, including: fines,
negative publicity for the offence, loss of rights and privileges such as
services and benefits from the federation, as well as assistance and support
from other affiliates. 49 Hence, unions are cognizant of the need to keep the
peace and avoid organizing conflicts, especially among affiliate members
of the same federation. In Canada, the Canada Labour Congress (CLC)
constitution also has provisions against raiding and offers protocols for
dispute resolution. Specifically, Article 4 (clause 5a) states "... No affiliate

will try to organize or represent employees who have an established
bargaining relationship with another affiliate or otherwise seek to disrupt
the relationship... "5
Third, it is not necessarily in the unions' best interest to add members
at all cost. Organizing campaigns are often expensive undertakings,
especially in the case of competing unions organizing the same worker
group, where additional time and resources are needed to 'out do' the other
union and, at times, to deal with dysfunctional conflicts. The potential
gains in membership can exceed the benefits. The benefits, in terms of
increased members and dues, are also likely to be uncertain compared to
the costs, even when they are higher on average. Moreover, organizing
drives divert limited resources from other potentially productive purposes,
involving, for example, service to existing members or lobbying to
promote workers' interests. More importantly, indiscriminate recruitment,
without regard to building a cohesive community of interests, means that
47. Clyde Scott, Edwin Arnold & Charles Odewahn. "Raid Elections: Another Problems for
Unions?" (1992) 21 Public Personnel Management 555 at 558.
48. American Federationof Labor and Congress ofIndustrialOrganizations,Constitution,Articles
XX & XXI online: AFL-CIO <http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ constitution>.
49. See George W Bohlander, "Keeping the Peace: AFL-CIO's Internal Dispute Plan" (2002) 57
Disp Res J 21.
50. Canadian Labour Congress, Constitution, Articles 4(5)(a), online: Canadian Labour Congress
<http://www.canadianlabour.ca/sites/default/files/pdfs/clc-constitution-english.pdf>.
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a union then has to serve disparate groups, spreading resources too thinly
and without achieving economies of scale. In other words, there is the
element of 'member fit' to be considered. It is often more economical and
more effective to focus on fewer workers, whose interests, attitudes, and
values are well aligned, than on more workers, whose interests, values,
and attitudes are more loosely related.'
Rather than compete to organize, unions often have good reasons to
collaborate to organize. As with inter-union collaboration in bargaining,
joint recruitment efforts help unions counter anti-union actions by the
employer. Employer resistance is likely to be greatest at the time of
organizing before a union has established an institutionalized workplace
presence. US employers often resort to unfair labour practices like firing
union organizers and threatening union supporters.52 There is even a rising
employer-oriented consulting industry, specializing in union avoidance."
When unions combine forces in the same organizing drive, employers
have a harder time opposing them; moreover, there are economies of
scale in at least some organizing activities. For example, unions can pool
resources to run joint campaigns, which more effectively reach the workers
in a particular industry.54 In addition, unions can come together to form
'organizing institutes,' which provide training and resources to organizers
as well as forums for sharing and discussing organizing experiences. Even
when unions prefer to run separate campaigns, they can still cooperate
by referring potential recruits to each other, based on the best fit and
the most suitable representation." In this way, each union has a better
chance of specializing in their area of strength, optimizing their resource
allocation, and aligning their activities with their strategic plans to gain
leverage over employers. At a lower level of collaboration, unions can
agree among themselves to recruiting in particular sectors, organizations,
or occupations, unnecessarily avoiding overlapping coverage. All these
51. The issue of 'member fit' was highlighted in a 2008 pilot study prepeding the current study,
involving interviews with 14 New Zealand union executives whose unions represented about 65%
of New Zealand's total union members. Nine of the 14 executives had referred potential members to
other unions which could provide them better services due to the union's characteristics, bargaining
coverage, and/or industrial/occupational fit.
52. See e.g. Morris M Kleiner, "Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline of
Unionization in the Private Sector" (2001) 22 Journal of Labor Research 519; John Logan, "The Fine
Art of Union Busting" (2004) 13:2 New Labor Forum (Routledge) 76.
53. John Logan, "The Union Avoidance Industry in the United States" (2006) 44 British Journal of
Industrial Relations 651.
54. Chris Schenk, "Forum: Reorganizing Unions - Union Organizing: An Ontario Labour
Perspective" (2004) 74 Studies in Political Economy 181.
55. John R Dobson, "The Effects of Multi-unionism: A Survey of Large Manufacturing
Establishments" (1997) 35 British Journal of Industrial Relations 547.
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forms of collaboration help unions to advance worker interests, and hence
workplace democracy, and enable unions to be more cost effective in
organizing and other activities.
3. Collaborationover policy issues
To advance a common social democratic vision, unions can find it
beneficial to collaborate in lobbying the government for legislative
changes and budgetary decisions more in tune with workers' broader
interests.5 6 In general, more inter-union collaboration means a stronger
and louder voice for labour and a greater influence on policy outcomes.
Joint efforts across unions to petition or protest against the government
are particularly important when union rights are being undermined by
governmental actions, as with, for example, the BC Health Services
case. Joint campaigns can also be effective in combating injustice and
promoting democracy. A well known example is the 'Battle of Seattle'
in 1999, in which approximately 30,000 unionists from various unions
joined to protest against the World Trade Organization, whose actions at
that time were perceived as anti-human rights and a threat to the labour
movement."
Policy changes often affect many unions simultaneously, encouraging
them to band together in common cause. Union federations obviously
provide one important means of organizing union action. For example,
they assist by offering facilities for meetings, workshops or conferences,
facilitating the collaborative process, resolving disputes which are
obstacles to collaboration, and establishing committees to work on labour
issues, such as health and safety, with general appeal.
4. Collaborationover other areas
There are many other areas unions can cooperate with each other. Basically,
almost everything that unions do can involve collaboration. For example,
unions can join together to offer group benefits and discounts, such as
insurance benefits and group membership perks. Such collaborations can
result in tremendous cost savings for unions and their members. Unions
can also come together to offer similar services like grievance handling,
training of union representatives, distributing membership materials, and

56. lan Greer, "Business Union vs Business Union? Understanding the Split in the US Labour
Movement" (2006) 90 Capital & Class 1.
57. Steve Zeltzer, "Global Victory for Workers in Seattle: Workers, Students, Activists Rout WTO"
(1999), online: Laboumet <http://www.laboumet.net/docks2/9912/wto37.htm>.
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disseminating union/labour information." Where unions share the same
workplace, there is the added potential advantage of sharing facilities and
equipment, and even administrative support. All of these collaborative
initiatives can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of unions. On the
more intangible side, unions can also help each other by sharing their
knowledge and experience so that best practices are promulgated.
Overall, the academic literature on inter-union relationships is far
from substantial, with research on collaboration, as opposed to conflict,
even more meagre. Still, the above review provides a glimpse of the key
reasons why unions work together. More systematic research of inter-union
relationships is certainly needed, as this could have significant implications
for any policy consideration of non-exclusive, non-majority unionism.
Our focus on collaboration does not mean that conflict can be ignored, but
the latter has been researched more extensively in the past and is outside
the scope of this current study. Our aim is to ensure that collaboration, and
its potential benefits, especially in the multi-union context, are properly
examined and not overlooked. Details of our empirical study, including
the method, sample, and results, are provided in the appendix.
IX. Discussion andpolicy implications
What can Canada learn from New Zealand's experiment with nonexclusive bargaining? Our research uncovered several key results. The
first, and perhaps most important, is that inter-union collaboration is
common; more than half of all unions, including the smallest, report doing
at least some. The second is that collaboration is especially prevalent
in collective bargaining and in policy-making/shaping. Non-exclusive
bargaining, or overlapping coverage, applies to about 30%, on average,
of a union's collective agreements. In these situations, nearly half of all
collective agreements are multi-union contracts bargained jointly with at
least one other union. Some other form of coordination applies to a further
20% of overlapping contract situations.
This study also shows that union collaboration has beneficial
consequences, particularly in collective bargaining and policy.
Approximately one quarter of the respondents reported improvements in
collective bargaining outcomes, including greater fairness for unskilled or
low waged members. Over one quarter of the respondents also reported
advantages of collaboration with respect to the policy area, including
58. See e.g. American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations, online:
<http://www.aflcio.orglaboutus/oi/main.cfm>; Canadian Labour Congress, online: <http://www.
canadianlabour.callabour-education>; New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, online: <http://union.
org.nzlorganizing>.
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greater influence over employers' policies and practices and more
credibility by having one voice. Even though the reported positive impact
of collaboration on membership recruitment was relatively less significant,
still, 15% of respondents felt collaboration had helped to increase overall
union membership, while a slightly smaller percentage reported that
collaboration had increased their own union's membership.
Our findings strongly suggest that unions in a multi-union setting do
cooperate and many see the benefits of doing so. There is certainly room to
improve collaboration by, for example, having more training to help union
leaders learn to cooperate. Apparently, training in soft skills like problem
solving, self-awareness, creativity, and sensitivity may be appropriate.
Policy changes to make it easier for unions to adopt multi-employer
agreements could also help promote union collaboration, as could having
a stronger role for the union federation and stronger good faith rules for
inter- union behaviour.
In Canada, the exclusive, majority-based representation system is a
deeply ingrained one, and so any move to an alternative system involving
multi-unionism would come with great concerns about union rivalry and
the potential for losing union members. Our study's major finding that
union collaboration is common and that there are a number of benefits to be
gained from cooperating should prompt union leaders and policy makers
to re-consider and re-evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages
of a non-exclusive, non-majority representation system, one that is more
in line ILO principles. Furthermore, this need not involve a total overhaul
of the representation system. Certification could be retained for unions
establishing majority support through a vote or card-check, just as is now,
while simultaneously allowing non-exclusive, non-majority unionism in
workplaces not presently having a certified union.
X. Limitations andfuture research

As with any study, this one comes with a few limitations. First, the study
was done in New Zealand and so the applicability of the findings to Canada
could be questioned; however, as discussed earlier, the two countries are
similar in many regards. In addition, Canada has exclusive representation
and does not permit two or more unions to represent the same bargaining
unit. So, the study had to be conducted elsewhere, and New Zealand is
arguably the most, or one of the most, appropriate alternative research
settings.
The second limitation relates to having a sample of only 121
respondents. Nevertheless, this still represents 79% of the total population
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of registered unions, covering 96.9% of union members. We therefore
trust that our sample does truly represent all New Zealand unions.
As acknowledged earlier, our focus is on the collaboration side of the
inter-union relationship. There is clearly a conflict side as well and it is
certainly important that more research is done on both sides of such a
relationship to advance knowledge in the area.
Conclusion
The conventional wisdom is that competition and conflict pervade multiunion situations, characterized by overlapping coverage in the same
bargaining unit. In contrast, this study found that inter-union collaboration
is normal, at least in New Zealand. Unions mostly cooperate over collective
bargaining and policy issues and to a lesser extent over organizing.
Moreover, respondents reported a number of benefits associated with such
collaboration.
Evidence of such widespread inter-union collaboration should help to
allay union and policy-maker fears concerning the supposed detriments
of non-exclusive, minority unionism, and encourage people to think more
positively about reforming the existing system so that it better recognizes
minority rights. Legitimizing and supporting minority representation in
workplaces with no exclusive bargaining agent presents unions with a
win-win situation: certified agents would remain relatively protected from
inter-union competition; unions could recruit and represent new members
in non-union workplaces where there is not (yet) majority support for a
union (e.g., banks). How can this be bad for unions? There is no obvious
downside for workplace democracy. Most importantly, such a move is
intrinsically appealing for being consistent with freedom of association
under the Charter and, more broadly, with ILO principles based on
fundamental human rights.
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Appendix
I. Methods
1. Sample
To acquire the right to strike and bargain collectively under the 2000
Employment Relations Act, 9 New Zealand labour unions must first
register with the Department of Labour. The Department's union registry
contains a complete list of unions, their phone number, and an email
address for a top union official (e.g. general secretary or president). The
researchers obtained an up-to-date registry in November, 2009, and used it
as their sampling frame. It contained a total of 159 unions. After attempts
were made to contact the unions, it became obvious that four were 'in
recess' and one other had formally combined with another union, and so
the adjusted total union population was 154. Following emails and phone
calls, described further below, 121 union leaders responded by filling out
the entire questionnaire. An additional four filled out the first few questions
concerning bargaining collaboration, but did not complete the rest of the
survey. Overall, therefore, the response rate was 79% for the completed
questionnaire, and 82% for the bargaining questions. The percentages
provided below are for a total sample of 121, except when the figure of
125 is used instead for the bargaining collaboration data. The respondent
unions collectively represent 376,306 (96.9%) of New Zealand's 387,959
union members, as recorded in the Department of Labour's 2009 Union
Membership Report.
2. Data collection
The researchers devised a survey and placed it on surveymonkey.com.
The survey contains relating to each type of inter-union collaboration
described in the literature review. The ideas behind specific questions
in the survey came from a pilot study, which involved interviews of top
union officials in August, 2008. Fourteen such leaders were interviewed
with open-ended questions concerning the frequency, character (e.g.,
bargaining, organizing), and consequences of inter-union collaboration,
plus proposals for reforms which might encourage more of it.
The first part of the survey had a few questions about the basic
characteristics of each union (e.g. industry, membership numbers, number
of collective agreements).
The second part focused on inter-union collaboration in collective
bargaining, with a specific focus on situations with overlapping coverage

59.

Employment Relations Act 2000, (NZ), 2000/24.
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(e.g., non-exclusive representation). Questions asked first assessed how
many collective agreements entailed overlapping coverage, having already
established the total number of agreements. Later questions focused on how
many of these overlapping agreements involved one of three different types
of inter-union collaboration. The first, and highest, form of collaboration
involves joint bargaining for a multi-union collective agreement-e.g.,
one contract which covers two or more different unions' members doing
the same work in the same workplace. The second form of collaboration
entails coordinated bargaining, but where there is no common collective
agreement. The third, and most limited, form of collaboration comprises
sharing bargaining-related information, but without actually engaging
in any coordination in real time (e.g., as when one union negotiates an
agreement long before the other).
The third part of the survey concentrated on other forms of inter-union
collaboration, though chiefly collaboration in organizing and policymaking/shaping. All of these questions asked respondents about the
frequency of various forms of inter-union collaboration over the previous
three year period, assessed on a six-point scale from 'never' to 'five or
more times.'
The third part of the survey asked the respondents about the advantages
their union had experienced in collaborating with other unions over the
previous three years. Some of these advantages related to collective
bargaining (e.g., 'higher wage and salary settlements;' 'greater fairness
in contract outcomes for the unskilled or low waged'). Others related to
organizing (e.g., 'An increase in members for our union;' 'An increase
in members for the entire union movement') or to policy (e.g., 'more
influence over government policies;' 'more credibility from speaking and
acting with one voice'). Respondents were asked to indicate whichever
consequences had been relevant to them by ticking the appropriate
boxes. They were also invited to indicate whether there had been 'other'
consequences, perhaps omitted from the list.
The fourth part of the survey asked the union leaders about their
support for various reform proposals. Some of these explicitly focused
on bargaining (e.g., 'freedom to lawfully engage in secondary picketing;'
'freedom to lawfully engage in secondary strikes'). Others were about
promoting ideological cohesion across unions (e.g., 'a ban on house
unions') or reducing the numbers of potential competitors (e.g., 'a
minimum union membership rule for union registration'). Once again,
union leaders were invited to tick the boxes beside all reform proposals
they supported and to indicate whether they had any 'other' proposals.
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In November and December, 2010, the lead researcher emailed the
questionnaire to 154 of the 159 union leaders in the registry, and mailed
it to the 14 others without an email address. The unions were collectively
emailed the survey a further seven times or mailed it once more. Anyone
who had not by then completed the questionnaire was telephoned up to
three times, prompting and/or persuading him/her to respond. A few union
leaders furnished information over the telephone, though only if their
union had not collaborated with another union over the three year period.
II. Results
Many New Zealand unions collaborate with other unions. Sixty nine
unions (57%) report having cooperated with other unions in bargaining,
organizing, policy-making/ lobbying, or some other respect.
1. Collaborationover bargaining
Overlapping coverage is a common phenomenon in New Zealand, in the
sense that two or more unions often represent workers doing the same
sorts of jobs in the same workplace. Sixty one unions (49%) report that
at least one of their collective agreements has overlapping coverage with
one or more other unions' collective agreements. The frequency of overlap
is considerable. Twenty six (21%) unions reveal that all (e.g., 100%) of
their collective agreements (and there may be only one or two) overlap
with other unions' collective agreements. Thirty four (27%) indicate that
more than half of their collective agreements overlap with other unions'
collective agreements. Overall, bargaining coverage overlaps in an average
of 31% of the unions' collective agreements for the entire sample.
Sharing the same sorts of members in the same workplaces spurs unions
to cooperate on a grand scale. Forty four of the 61 unions (72%) with at
least some overlapping coverage had collaborated with other unions during
bargaining. The 61 unions indicate that they cooperate in bargaining for an
average of 66% of their collective agreements with overlapping coverage.
As stated earlier, collaboration in bargaining may take one of three basic
forms. First, and at one extreme, two or more unions may jointly negotiate
a single, multi-union collective agreement (MUCA), which equally applies
to their respective members. Second, two or more unions may coordinate
their bargaining claims and/or bargaining strategies with each other, while
still bargaining for separate agreements. Finally, two or more unions may
bargain entirely independently for separate collective agreements, but still
share critical bargaining information (e.g., with another union negotiating
several weeks or months later).
Joint negotiation is especially commonplace in New Zealand. Thirty
eight of the 61 unions (62%) with overlapping coverage had bargained
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jointly for a multi-union collective agreement. Eighteen of the 61
unions (30%) say that all of their overlapping contracts are multi-union
collective agreements. Though most of these unions negotiate just one
or two contracts in total, one union leader claims that all ten of his/her
union's collective agreements with overlapping coverage are multi-union
documents. Overall, the 61 unions bargain jointly for an average of 46%
of their collective agreements with overlapping coverage (e.g., 46% are
multi-union collective agreements).
Less commonly, 12 of the 61 unions (20%) say that they coordinate
bargaining for at least one of their overlapping collective agreements. Three
of these (5%) do so for all of their overlapping collective agreements. In
two of these cases, the union only ever negotiates one or two agreements,
but, in the other, there was coordination for all eight of the union's
overlapping contracts. On average, the 61 unions coordinate bargaining
with other unions for 8% of their collective agreements with overlapping
coverage.
Likewise, 13 of the 61 unions (21%) share bargaining information
relevant to at least one of their collective agreements. Again, two of these
(3%) do so for all of their collective agreements, and both of these are
single agreement situations. The 61 unions share bargaining information
related to an average of 11% of their overlapping collective agreements.
2. Collaborationover organizing
Table I shows that joint organizing efforts are much less common in New
Zealand than other forms of union cooperation. Nevertheless, the fact that
they happen at all, given extensive overlapping coverage, might come as
a surprise to some. The most common form of collaboration in this area
occurs when one union deliberately recruits members for another. Twenty
two (18%) unions report having done this during the three year period. This
also happens relatively often: eight unions (7%) say they have recruited
for other unions on five or more occasions over the previous three years. In
contrast, far fewer unions collaborate in other ways over organizing. Just
12 (10%) have runjoint membership recruitment campaigns; only ten (8%)
have helped to fund another union's recruitment campaign. Among unions
acting so cooperatively, these activities tend to be relatively infrequent.
Just one union reports having helped fund another's recruitment campaign
five or more times over the three year period.
3. Collaborationover policy
Many New Zealand unions cooperate with other unions to influence
industry/government policies (see Table 1). Most prefer an indirect
approach, using, for example, either the New Zealand Council of Trade
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Unions (NZCTU) or industry-based bodies to sway the government. For
example, 34 unions (28%) report having participated in NZCTU forums,
workshops, councils, and committees, while 36 (30%) admit to having
been involved in industry policy or decision-making groups, over the
three year period. When unions do use the NZCTU or industry bodies,
they tend to use them relatively often. Twenty two unions (18%) say they
have participated in NZCTU forums and so forth at least five times in the
previous three years. Likewise, 17 (14%) indicate they have been involved
in industry policy or decision-making groups at least five times over the
same period.
Less common are more direct modes of influence, with unions
working in pairs or small groups to influence policy. As an example, 23
unions (19%) had coalesced with other unions to lobby the government
for changes in policies or laws over the previous three years. Eighteen
(15%) had banded together with other unions to make joint submissions
to parliamentary select committees, vocalising their common support
or opposition to proposed legislation (bills). Joint submissions are an
infrequent occurrence for those doing this; only three unions reported
having done it five or more times in the three year period. However, joint
lobbying is a much more regular activity for unions choosing this line of
influence; 14 unions (12%) reported having coalesced in this way five or
more times over the previous three years.
4. Other collaboration
New Zealand unions also collaborate in other ways (see Table 1). Thirty
four union leaders (28%) say they have shared facilities and/or staff with
other unions. A slightly smaller number, 31 (26%), admit to having jointly
organised or conducted the training of members with other unions. Twenty
three (19%) say they have jointly run public relations campaigns with
other unions. Joint training and sharing facilities or staff are commonplace
for some unions. Twelve unions (100/) say they have jointly organised or
conducted training five or more times over the three year period, while 17
(14%) indicate they have shared facilities or staff.
5. Consequences of collaborating
Unions which had collaborated over the prior three years identified several
key advantages to such collaboration (see Table 2). Union cooperation
appears to be particularly beneficial in collective bargaining. Thirty four
union leaders (28%) feel that cooperating had produced relatively fairer/
better contract outcomes for the unskilled and/or low waged. Slightly
fewer union leaders, 29 (24%), believe that collaboration had delivered
superior terms and conditions for their members, more generally. A still
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substantial number, 17 (14%), claim that cooperating has enabled their
members to obtain higher wages/salaries.
Cooperating has also substantially helped unions in their efforts
to indirectly affect government and employer policies. For instance,
33 (27%) claim that they had achieved more influence over employer
policies and practices by working together. Also, 20 (17%) argue that their
influence over public policy has been enhanced through cooperation. More
generally, 32 (26%) believe that acting and speaking with one, unified
voice has earned them greater credibility/legitimacy with employers and
government.
In contrast, inter-union cooperation was less of a help with organizing
new members. Eighteen (15%) union leaders say that working together
has brought in new members to the entire labour movement. Fourteen
(12%) indicate that cooperating has enabled their union, in particular, to
recruit more members.
Respondents identify other potential advantages of cooperation. Three
respondents suggest that working together and sharing resources had
increased economies of scale and cut costs. Two claim that collaborating
stops employers from using 'divide and rule' games to play one union off
against another. Two also say that collaboration promotes unity, a common
sense of their being a broader labour movement. Two others argue that
cooperating gives some unions (e.g., smaller ones) the opportunity to learn
crucial skills and knowledge (e.g., about how to negotiate) from other
unions.
6. Recommendationsfor more collaboration
Table 3 indicates how many, and what percentage of, union leaders
supported which recommendations. Many union leaders are not convinced
that new policies are needed to encourage more inter-union collaboration;
57 union leaders (47%) expressly indicated that no reforms are necessary.
However, there were still some who feel that union leaders need to learn a
lot more about how to cooperate; 32 (24%) feel that union leaders would
benefit from training to cooperate.
Some union leaders believe that reforms could induce unions to
collaborate more in collective bargaining. One of these focuses on
enhancing the potential benefits of joint action. For example, 24 union
leaders (20%) favour legal changes which would enable unions to more
easily opt for multi-employer collective agreements (MECAs). Other*
reform suggestions emphasize facilitating joint action in the collective
bargaining process. As an example, 17 union leaders (14%) want
secondary picketing legalized. In the same vein, 18 union leaders (15%)
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would like secondary strikes to be made lawful. Twenty two (18%) believe
that stronger good faith rules could be used to prompt unions to share
information and otherwise behave more cooperatively.
At the policy level, 23 union leaders (19%) claim that there would
be more inter-union collaboration if the New Zealand Council of Trade
Unions took a stronger role in organizing and leading joint actions.
Other more general reform proposals could have applied to bargaining,
organizing, or policy-making. Two focus on building ideological cohesion
across unions by first outlawing house unions, a policy favoured by 12
leaders (10%), and second by auditing unions periodically to ensure they
are democratic and independent of management, a policy favoured by 11
leaders (9%). A third focuses on reducing the number of unions, and hence
lessening the potential for competition and conflict, by establishing a
minimum membership rule for union registration, also a policy supported
by 11 leaders (9%).
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Table 2
Consequences of Inter-Union Collaboration
Collective bargaining

Number

Percent

Greater fairness in contract outcomes for
unskilled or low waged

34

28%

Higher wages
members

for

17

14%

Improvements in other contract terms &
conditions for members

29

24%

More influence over employers' policies &
practices

33

27%

More influence on government policies

20

17%

More credibility from acting & speaking with
one voice

32

26%

An increase in members for the entire labour
movement

18

15%

An increase in members for our union

14

12%

& salary

settlements

Policy

Organizing
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Table 3
Proposed Reforms to Increase Collaboration
Number

Percent

No changes necessary

57

47%

Cooperation Training for union leaders

32

24%

Easier processes to opt for multi-employer agreements

24

20%

Freedom to lawfully secondary picket

17

14%

Freedom to lawfully secondary strike

18

15%

Stronger good faith rules for inter-union behaviour

22

18%

Stronger role for NZCTU in organising joint action

23

19%

Ban on company unions

12

10%

Auditing of unions to ensure they are democratic &
independent of management

11

9%

Reform Proposals

